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CURRENT PROSPECTS FOR ENTRY INTO SHALE
OIL PRODUCTION-WITH OR WITHOUT
LEASING OF FEDERAL OIL SHALE LANDS
HENRY STEELE*

During the Hearings on the competitive aspects of oil shale
development held by the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly
of the Senate Judiciary Committee in April and May of 1967, Senator Hart and his colleagues repeatedly sought the answer to one
question which was highly pertinent to their investigation.1 Why do
private firms, currently holding oil shale lands with physical reserves
amounting to tens of billions of barrels, insist that this is an insufficient basis for undertaking production, and that a favorable
decision on production must await the announcement of an acceptable set of policy decisions on public oil shale land leasing, import
controls, conservation regulation, and depletion allowances? A
variety of answers were given by various witnesses, but Senator
Hart was unconvinced by them and indicated his suspicion that
major oil firms only wanted access to public lands in order to control oil shale reserves and defer production until some future period
when exploitation of these resources would be consistent with long
run profit maximization in the total energy market.
In this paper an attempt is made to answer Senator Hart's question. The principal contentions may be summarized as follows: ( 1)
shale oil production technology is already well advanced, and exploitation through one or more developed methods "conventional"
mining and retorting can accomplish large scale production at sufficiently low cost to yield profit rates after taxes which, while absolutely high, are not excessive in relation to the risks of pioneering
a new industry. (2) Major oil firms, however, are more interested
in developing in situ processes, the considerable length of time required to perfect them being regarded as one of their advantages.
(3) The crucial concern of prospective investors in shale oil operations is not that current costs are too high, but that current domestic prices for crude oil may be "too high" in the sense that they
are well above world price levels and might be subject to downward
pressures if import and conservation policies were altered. (4)
Another factor giving rise to concern over future price declines is
* Professor of Economics, University of Houston, Houston, Texas.
1. Competitive Aspects of Oil Shale Development, Hearings on S. 26 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 1 (1967).
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the possibility that shale oil production may increase much more
rapidly than is generally expected once the industry gets underway.
(5) Decisions on federal shale land leasing policies are certainly
of interest to potential entrants, but other decisions, such as the
enunciation of an official policy for "phasing in" oil shale production
into the total energy market, are of much greater importance. (6)
An increase in the depletion allowance for oil shale, while helpful
in reducing the tax disadvantage of shale relative to crude oil, would
be less beneficial than is generally supposed; furthermore, the oil
industry seems reluctant to make a major issue of the 27.5 % depletion allowance for shale oil since this would open the depletion controversy to another agonizing reappraisal at the federal level. (7)
The federal oil shale land leasing regulations proposed by the Department of the Interior in 1967 seem to be based in large part
upon false analogies between crude oil and shale oil and will not
promote desirable efforts toward entry by private firms, particularly
the anomalous "research and development lease" arrangement. (8)
Industry reluctance to exploit shale oil and, in the long run, to convert the industry largely from a crude oil to a shale oil basis may also
be due to the greatly decreased political influence of a shale oil industry which would have production in only one to three states, no
lobby of ten thousand or more small producers, and no support from
several million royalty recipients.
These observations suggest several tentative conclusions. First,
the enunciation of any reasonable leasing policy for federal oil shale
lands will not, by itself, have any great influence on the willingness
of most major oil firms to engage in shale oil production in the next
ten or more years. A liberal policy would probably result in more
shale land acquisition but would not accelerate the rate of industry
development. A strict policy involving high costs for speculative
holding of idle lands would limit acquisitions. Second, in the absence
of any leasing of public lands, one or more firms will probably undertake successful commercial scale operations on private lands. Colony
has announced its plan to produce 58,000 barrels per day by 1970,
and the demonstration of successful plant operations on this scale
would probably induce the entry of one or more large oil companies
having shortages of crude oil reserves. Third, the entry of any major
oil firms during the years prior to the perfection of an in situ technique for retorting will be a reluctant entry, although some firms
may enter shale oil production in order to protect themselves competitively. Fourth, the implications for government policy seem
clearer on the negative than on the positive side. The government
should be extremely careful about adopting any explicit policies re-
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garding the "phasing in" of shale oil, particularly with respect to
the effect on price levels of such a policy in the context of other arrangements supporting prices. Research and development "leases"
should not be used. It is highly desirable that public decisions on
shale oil issues be an integrated program and not a series of isolated
pronouncements. Thus, ideally, a simultaneous resolution of all
policy issue uncertainty should be achieved by means of explicit decisions on leasing, depletion, imports, state conservation regulation,
and federal offshore crude oil production policies.2 These decisions,
of course, must remain flexible and to some extent tentative. It is
clear that much more study is needed before an appropriate oil shale
leasing policy can be adopted-study comprising not only a more
adequate appraisal of the resource itself, but also, among other
things, a comprehensive investigation of the effect of the existing
complex of policy measures on crude oil price levels, and the relationship of prices to foreign and domestic costs, supplies, and the various
dimensions of the nation's security posture.
I
ESTIMATED CURRENT COSTS OF PRODUCING
SHALE OIL AND SHALE OIL PRODUCTS

How much are the oil shale deposits worth? A handsome range
of estimates was presented before the Hart Subcommittee. Former
Senator Douglas suggested a maximum of $7 trillion, and Bruce
Netschert indicated a preference for a zero valuation.4 Narrowly
considered, the value to a firm contemplating production from such
resources logically would be the present discounted value of the
future stream of net receipts obtainable from the exploitation of the
resource. Everything depends upon expected production costs relative to revenues. But, in view of the crucial importance of the level
of production costs to the entire shale oil debate, it is remarkable
that so little insistence has been placed upon the presentation of
comprehensive and authoritative production cost estimates.
If the demand for authoritative cost data is surprisingly weak, the
available supply is virtually zero. This is not the result of an actual
absence of detailed engineering evaluations-more than two dozen
firms are likely to be conducting such studies at present-but to the
2. The limited scope of this paper does not permit consideration of other facets of
shale oil policy which do not bear quite as directly on oil industry prices and economics,
such as scenic conservation, water policy, elaborate waste disposal methods, and conservation of minerals other than shale oil.
3. Competitive Aspects, supra note 1, at 107.
4. Id. at 131.
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virtually quasi-military secrecy imposed on any information secured
by the investigators. The approaches to the Colony plant are said
to bristle with armed guards, and visitors to the Anvil Points research center (where 26 firms are doing joint research on in situ
methods) are stopped by guards about a mile from the entrance.' If
nothing else, this would lead one to believe that what has been
learned is well worth guarding. Still, until private firms can be
persuaded to share their closely-guarded cost data, only a few
sources are available from which to draw inferences regarding actual
present cost levels: (1) the author's 1962 study based on engineering cost data for the production of crude shale oil;" (2) a 1966
study done by the Bureau of Mines using similar cost data and
including refined shale oil products as well as crude shale oil ;7 and
(3) the existence of the fact that Colony believes it worthwhile to
invest $130 million in a commercial scale plant." Each of these
three sources will be examined in turn.
In 1962, the author made conservative estimates of the costs
of mining, crushing and retorting 25,000 barrels per day of crude
shale oil and the costs of conveying it by a small-diameter pipeline
to the Four Corners area. These estimates were made with the aid
of the engineering firm of Cameron and Jones of Denver, Colorado,
and the study was financed by a grant from Resources For the
Future, Inc. Mining methods were by room-and-pillar techniques
from cliff-face sites to produce 41,000 tons per day of 30 gallon per
ton shale. Retorting was by the Bureau of Mines gas-combustion
method, as modified by Cameron and Jones, and the process facilities consisted of a bank of 12 cylindrical retorts each 36 feet in
diameter. As of 1962, total cost per barrel after leaving the retort
was estimated at $1.46, of which 98 cents was mining cost, 9 cents
shale preparation cost, 27 cents retorting cost, and 12 cents viscosity
breaking cost. Transportation to the Los Angeles market would
have increased the cost to $1.99 per barrel for crude oil selling at
about $2.90 at the time, resulting in a gross margin of 91 cents per
barrel which is sufficient to allow a rate of return on average invested capital of 14.7 per cent. Economies of large scale pipeline
transportation are so great, however, that the cost per barrel in Los
5. Id. at 395.
6. Steele, The Prospects For the Development of a Shale Oil Industry, 3 Western
Econ. J. 60-82 (1963).
7. A Cost Analysis of An Oil Shale Installation in Colorado (1966), Exhibit G-667
presented by the Project Evaluation Group of the United States Bureau of Mines,
Morgantown, West Virginia, in behalf of the United States Department of Land Management in the two contests, United States v. Winegar, and United States v. D. A. Shale
Inc., in Denver, Colo., July 1967. [Hereinafter cited as Cost Analysis]
8. Competitive Aspects, supra note 1, at 334.
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Angeles of a 250,000 barrel per day operation would be only $1.76,
permitting a rate of return of 20.4 per cent. The author referred
to these cost estimates as conservative since he was aware, at the
time they were made, that a major mining company had expressed
willingness to contract for mining oil shale at a price equivalent to
about 68 cents per barrel of shale oil derived from 30 gallon per
ton shale. Hence cost estimates 30 cents per barrel lower than the
author's 1962 estimates might have been appropriate.
The author has no precise way of updating his 1962 cost data.
Pipeline tariffs to Los Angeles apparently have increased by about
18 cents per barrel. Retorting costs may have dropped about 6 cents
per barrel between 1962 and 1965, but may have increased for reasons of price inflation since 1965. The author has been advised that,
on the whole, technological advances, in this particular complex
of processes, have just about kept pace with price inflation since
1962, so that the cost per barrel in Los Angeles might be from
$1.87 to $2.17 for a 50,000 barrel per day operation and $1.64
to $1.94 for a 250,000 barrel per day operation, if the lower limit is
computed to include 68 cents per barrel mining costs. Using the
lower cost estimate one might project a profit rate of 16.5 per cent
on the 25,000 barrel per day operation, and 22.2 per cent on the
250,000 barrel per day operation, if profits are computed on average
invested capital, after taxes, with no depletion allowance.
In the past students of shale oil costs have become accustomed
to more or less complete reliance on government sources for detailed studies on process costs such as those done in the late 1940's
by the Bureau of Mines or in the 1950's for the Corps of Engineers
or the Department of the Interior. The most recent complete study
also has been prepared under government sponsorship, but it differs
from the others in that its immediate function is forensic rather than
purely informational. The Project Evaluation 'Group of the Bureau
of Mines at Morgantown, West Virginia has prepared a study of
the costs of producing 40,290 barrels per day of crude shale oil and
32,990 barrels of refined shale oil products as of 1966.10 This study
was prepared at the request of the Bureau of Land Management in
order to contribute to the successful prosecution of litigation in
which the Bureau of Land Management is claiming forfeiture of
rights by the holders of certain oil shale land mining claims because
of their failure of discovery. One element of proof of failure of
discovery would consist, the Bureau contends, of demonstration
that the deposits were not capable of sufficiently profitable exploita9. Steele, supra note 6, at 72 (table), 74 & 75.
10. Cost Analysis, supra note 7, at 1-20.

OCTOBER 1968]

PROSPECTS FOR ENTRY INTO SHALE OIL PRODUCTION

667

tion to induce investors to risk their capital in such an enterprise.
Since the legal proceeding is adversary, it is to be expected that each
party will attempt in accordance with established legal procedures
to make the best possible case in his own behalf. Hence the possibility
exists that there may be an upward bias in the costs presented in
the Morgantown study, in that any decisions involving a choice between a higher-cost and a lower-cost alternative might be resolved
in favor of the former. Hence the costs reported might most wisely
be regarded as representing the upper limit of the probable range
of costs actually to be encountered.
The processing complex can be briefly described. It consists of a
mine and a retorting plant in Garfield County, Colorado, a preliminary refinery at DeBeque, Colorado, a pipeline from DeBeque to
Fort Laramie, Wyoming, the use of existing pipeline facilities from
Fort Laramie to Saint Louis, Missouri, and a final refining installation at Saint Louis. 60,300 tons of 30 gallon per ton shale is mined
daily by the room and pillar method from cliff-face sites with a mining thickness of 61 feet (33-foot heading round and 28-foot bench
round). 68.7 per cent of the shale rock will be recovered. The mined
shale is crushed and fed to the retorting phase. Dust losses are 600
tons per day. Of the 59,700 tons of crushed shale conveyed daily
to the retorts, 57,020 tons come directly from the crushers, and
2,680 tons of shale fines are briquetted before being fed to the
retorts.
The crushed shale and shale briquets are conveyed to the seven
cylindrical modified gas combustion retorts, each 45 feet in diameter.
The output from the retorts is 40,290 barrels per day of crude shale
oil, 359 million cubic feet of excess low-BTU retort gas, and 44,370
tons of shale ash. The ash is discharged into an adjoining canyon
and is periodically compacted. The shale oil is fed by pipeline to the
preliminary refinery at DeBeque where it is subjected to delayed
coking and hydrogenation, yielding 35,020 barrels per day of semifinished liquid products (hydrogenated distillate) as well as substantial amounts of by-product coke, ammonia, sulfur, and salable
high-BTU excess refinery gas.
The hydrogenated distillate is shipped 400 miles to Fort Laramie,
Wyoming through a ten inch pipeline, and is then transported
through an existing commercial pipeline a distance of 800 miles to
Saint Louis, where final refining occurs, yielding about 16,000 barrels per day of premium gasoline, 14,000 barrels of high-quality
diesel fuel, and 3,000 barrels of liquefied petroleum gas, as well as
some 6 million cubic feet of marketable high-BTU excess refinery
gas.
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Table I shows the total capital requirements, annual operating
costs, and average cost per ton of shale mined and per barrel of
crude shale oil and refined products produced. Costs of mining and
retorting the crude shale oil are $1.23 per barrel; Colorado refining
increases the cost to $1.82 per barrel. Transportation costs are 34
cents per barrel of crude shale oil produced by the retort, but since
the volume of liquid products is reduced by about one-seventh in the
Colorado refinery, transportation costs per barrel of hydrogenated
distillate actually shipped through the pipeline are 39 cents per barrel. Costs per barrel of crude shale oil for refining in Saint Louis
amount to 55 cents, but costs per barrel of hydrogenated distillate
actually processed are about 63 cents. Total costs per barrel of crude
shale oil are $2.71, but costs per barrel of hydrogenated distillate
are $3.10. Finally, total costs per barrel of gasoline and diesel oil
produced are $3.65, the volume of these two fuels being only about
86 per cent of the volume of the hydrogenated distillate input to
the Saint Louis refinery.
Unfortunately, none of these per barrel cost figures can be compared directly with prices per barrel to compute unit profits in any
satisfactory manner. First, the presence of by-products and joint
products prevents definitive cost analysis. Second, there are no market prices available for any of the liquid products at any stage except for the gasoline and diesel fuel finished products. The best sort
of unit profit computation which could be made would consist of
comparing the cost per barrel of gasoline and diesel oil with the
composite market price of the two fuels in the ratio they are produced, after adjusting either costs or revenues for by-products and
joint products. The usual method of treating by-products is to deduct revenues of their sale from the total cost of producing all
products, and then to simply charge the remaining costs against
the principal product. This procedure has well-known drawbacks,
which increase as the ratio of by-product revenues to total cost increases. But if we subtract all by-product revenues ($10,414,180
per year) from total annual operating cost ($40,003,500) and
divide the difference by total annual production of gasoline and
diesel fuel, the computed cost per barrel for the composite of these
two fuels is $2.70. The weighted average price for the composite
of these fuels is $4.99, so that a constructive unit profit of $2.29
per barrel is realized, which would be applied to an annual production of some 10.95 million barrels of these products. If one were to
include liquified petroleum gas with gasoline and diesel fuel in
order to compute average cost per barrel of total liquid fuel products, the cost per barrel would be $2.65 and the composite price
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would be $4.72, yielding a computed per barrel profit of $2.07,
which would be applied to an annual output of some 12.04 million
barrels of the three products. In either case the ultimate arbitrary
nature of the method may be misleading because of the relatively
high ratio of by-product receipts to total operating costs: 26.0 per
cent in the first instance and 20.3 per cent in the second.
A less misleading approach is simply to compute annual profits on
all operations in total and compare after-tax profits with average
invested capital. Table II shows daily receipts per product and total
TABLE II
PRODUCT SELLING PRICES AND ANNUAL RECEIPTS, FOR 1966 INTEGRATED OIL SHALE
OPERATION PROCESSING 60,300 TONS OF COLORADO OIL SHALE PER DAY
Product
Excess refinery
Gas-Colorado
Excess refinery
Gas-Missouri
Diesel fuel
Liquefied
Petroleum gas
Premium gasoline
Coke
Ammonia
Sulfur

Volume produced per day

Unit value

Daily receipts

3.144 Million cu. ft. (1266 Btu/cf)

$.40/mm Btu

$ 1,592

5.964 Million cu. ft. (431 Btu/cf)
14,008 Barrels

$.40/mm Btu
$.1025/gal.

1,028
60,304

$.05/gal.
$.1325/gal.
$9.50/ton
$92/ton
$25/ton

6,245
89,079
10,008
8,565
1,094

2,974 Barrels
16,007 Barrels
1053.5 Tons
93.1 Tons
43.75 Tons

Total receipts per day
Total receipts per year

$177,915
$64,939,000

annual receipts, and Table III shows annual gross and net income
and cash flow. Net income after taxes is $12.0 million per year and
annual cash flow is $24.3 million. This implies a rate of return of
TABLE III
FINANCIAL ANALYSIS FOR 1966 INTEGRATED OIL SHALE OPERATION PROCESSING

60,300

TONS OF COLORADO OIL SHALE PER DAY

Total Capital Investment
Annual Sales Receipts
Annual Operating Costs
Gross Income

$185,482,200
64,939,000
40,003,500
24,935,500

Depletion Allowance

1,848,800

Taxable Income

23,086,700

Federal Income Tax

11,081,616

Net Income After Taxes

12,005,084

Depreciation Allowed per Year
Depletion Allowance

10,424,900
1,848,800

Annual Cash Flow

$ 24,278,784
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12.9 per cent per year after taxes on average invested capital, which
can be interpreted as a probable minimum estimate in view of the
likely bias in the data toward the overestimation of costs and the
necessary investment for those items which require assignment of a
cost estimate involving questions of judgment. The most apparent
instance of cost overestimation occurs in the case of working capital,
which could defensibly be reduced by some $18 million. If this single
adjustment is made, the rate of return after taxes on average invested capital increases to 15.5 per cent. Other adjustments which
might be made would operate to improve further the rate of return,
chiefly by reducing taxes. Some items, such as initial catalysts and
chemicals, interest during construction, and start-up expenses would
be expensed rather than capitalized, with a resulting reduction in
book investment. The depletion allowance which is taken appears to
be well below that which could probably be obtained under present
law. And although a substantial credit against the income tax liability itself was available at the time of the 1966 study no investment
credit was taken.
The only other basis of inference about present estimated costs
is from Colony's statements regarding its own plans. These data can
readily be summarized in view of their sparsity. Colony intends to
have in operation by 1970 an oil shale complex mining 66,000 tons
of oil shale daily and producing 58,000 barrels per day of hydrotreated shale oil, with a total plant cost of under $130 million.
Furthermore, it has been stated that in computing expected profitability, Colony has been "burdened by the need to assume, against
ourselves, a number of very severe economic penalties in calculating
the rate of return."'" Can one take a wholesome crumb of data-a
capital cost of about $2,240 per daily barrel of production-and
reconstruct the dinosaur skeleton of projected total costs, revenues,
and profits? One does not know how to allocate the capital costs,
quite apart from the complete ignorance regarding estimates or
forecasts for any -other elements of total cost. One is similarly in
ignorance of estimated future prices and by-product operations, and
does not know the rate of return the firm considers necessary. What
is interesting, however, is the statement that Colony has deliberately
made the worst possible case for future rate of return in its profitability calculations and, nevertheless, has decided to undertake fullscale production. Again, one does not know the assumptions constituting the worst of all profitable worlds, but they would no doubt
include denial of recognition of shale oil as a refinery input for
computing import quotas, and obtaining of only the minimum per11.

Competitive Aspects, supra note 1, at 318.
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centage depletion tax deduction allowable under present law, which
although it might not be literally zero, might still be less than cost
depletion.
If one assumes that an investor desires a rate of return of at least
15 per cent for such an investment and then discounts entirely the
tax advantages of percentage depletion and reduces expected prices
by the six to eleven cents per barrel penalty shale oil would incur if
not eligible as refinery input source in computing import quotas, it
becomes apparent that costs must be quite low relative to expected
prices and that the company would be in a good position to make
very attractive profits if their deliberately pessimistic expectations
proved unfounded. If, in addition, the firm has predicted a long run
decline in crude oil prices, such as might result if policy decisions
were made which would increase imports and impair the effectiveness
of state production controls, then the enterprise's future would indeed appear bright.
Even so, it is not a profitable exercise to try to compute a range of
expected unit costs per barrel by assuming a minimal 15 per cent
rate of return, no percentage depletion allowance, a maximal perbarrel price penalty for adverse import-quota treatment, and future
prices which are constant or declining. Even without the presence of
too many unknowns, the resulting data would not compare with the
information from the earlier cost studies, if only because Colony
will be achieving much higher shale oil yields per ton of oil shale
mined than the earlier studies contemplated.
The author's 1962 study involved operations resulting in a ratio
of 25.6 gallons of crude shale oil recovered from every gross ton of
oil shale mined. The 1966 study contemplates a recovery of 28.1
gallons per ton-some 10 per cent higher; the Colony operation
projects 37 gallons per ton-45 per cent higher. At least three
factors can account for these differences. There may be variation
in crushing losses. The chief difference between the 1962 and 1966
studies is probably that recovery in 1966 was greater because of
the briquetting of the smallest crushed shale particles, although
this procedure naturally involves some additional costs. There may
also be variations in the percentage recovery of oil from the shale
rock. Here the Colony process would appear to be superior, reportedly yielding 103-104 per cent recovery of the modified Fischer
essay. Here, too, however, it is likely that higher recoveries may
in part be counterbalanced by higher process costs, although this
is not necessarily true over a period of time or when comparing two
different methods. Finally, the oil content of the shale rock may
vary, and it would appear that Colony is planning to mine much
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richer shales than were contemplated in the other studies. This is
to Colony's advantage, provided that the acquisition costs of the
shale were not correspondingly higher, which is possible since the
market for oil shale lands at present is quite imperfect.
One last difficulty which deserves mentioning is the unknown ratio
of debt to equity capital in Colony's prospective shale oil venture.
In order to penalize their economics with the most adverse projections, they would assume a zero debt to equity ratio. But several of
the earlier shale oil studies have assumed unusually high ratios. It
is always possible to make an enterprise with a rate of profit greater
than bond interest rates appear to display any desired level of returns by obtaining sufficiently high leverage through extreme debt
to equity ratios. However the shale oil industry is not yet a public
utility.
In summary, available evidence relating to probable production
costs, while it cannot be regarded as conclusive, suggests strongly
that the relationship of shale oil production costs to current crude
oil prices is sufficiently favorable from the point of view of profitability that it cannot be regarded as a factor discouraging entry.
Accordingly, other factors must be examined, particularly those
which relate to possible future downward pressures on crude oil
prices.
II
CURRENT PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES-THEIR IMPACT ON
SHALE OIL INDUSTRY INVESTMENT CLIMATE

Leasing Policies for FederalOil Shale Lands
One argument made by firms holding private shale lands but still
hesitating to enter the industry relates to their uncertainty over the
market impact of various policies on the future status of federal
oil shale lands. The typical contention is that since the richest lands
are federally held and since an industry should logically begin by
using the richest resources in the interest of cost minimization, federal leasing of these lands, on sufficiently favorable terms, is essential for the development of the industry. Resource richness in the
physical sense, however, cannot be divorced from costs of gaining
access to them, and it appears that the richest resources are also the
most difficult to reach by existing mining methods. Certain privately
held sites provide exceptions. The public lands will be more amenable to in situ methods which will probably not be perfected for ten
or twenty years; hence, those firms which are actually deterred from
entry by the present non-availability of federal lands would not be
J.
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planning to undertake production for a decade or more even after
acquiring suitable lands. A variant argument is that firms would not
enter production now on higher-cost private lands if, in the near
future, the government awarded leases on very liberal terms to
lower-cost public lands. This argument has some plausibility, but
the plausibility depends upon how much lower the costs would prove
to be on such public lands, how much longer it would take to develop
the lands by lower-cost methods, and how liberal the terms of leasing would be. The alleged fear that the government might enter the
shale oil business itself is a further reason for hesitation. If such
fears are genuine, it is surprising that the firms whch entertain them
have acquired, and continue to hold, shale lands. Actually, it is improbable that government will enter the market as a producer, and
it is also doubtful that shale lands will ever be leased on extremely
liberal terms. Firms holding private shale lands are concerned over
uncertainty regarding various policy decisions relating to shale oil,
but other decisions are more important than leasing policy per se.
The proposed regulations for leasing shale lands, which were issued in May 1967, did not strike the industry as being liberal and
do not seem conducive to any very rapid or even logical development of the industry. The notion of the research and development
lease seems particularly anomalous, and those who made statements
before Senator Hart's Subcommittee unanimously criticized it. If
the government wishes to have research and development done on
oil shale, the logical approach is to have it done under contract. If
it wishes to lease shale lands, the logical approach is to devise an
appropriate form of production lease. Those elements in the proposed regulations which do have a bearing upon production leasing
seem to be somehow inappropriate or irrelevant in relationship to
the optimal requirements for shale oil production leases. It would
seem that those on the Department of the Interior staff who drafted
the proposed regulations followed, as guides, certain features of
contracts which exist between American oil companies and Middle
Eastern governments. 12 If this is the case, it is not surprising that
many of the proposals seem inapplicable: there is no basis for analogy between appropriate Colorado oil shales leasing procedures and
current procedures existing in the Middle East.
The assumptions behind Interior's oil shale leasing policy seem to
12. Secretary Udall stated before Senator Hart's Subcommittee that "[M]any of the
oil producing countries in the Middle East and else where have, through the use of different types of performance contracts, developed techniques for assuring performance
. . .", and also that "[s]ome of the foreign countries that have gotten smart lawyers are
even better than we are in terms of how you protect the interests of a nation that owns a
resource." Id. at 281 & 293.
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include the following: (1) Existing shale oil technology is not sufficiently developed to form the basis for a commercial industry. (2)
The logical first site of industry development will be in the richest
federal lands.' 3 (3) In situ methods are regarded as the most promising retorting techniques. (4) An industry will not begin to develop
for at least ten years. These assumptions might be more or less
mutually consistent if all shale lands were federally owned. The
first two assumptions are doubtful; the last two may be made to appear correct if a leasing policy is adopted which strongly favors the
development of in situ methods. If all shale lands were federally
owned, and only the richest were offered for lease, these lands, with
their substantial overburdens, might appeal only to those firms interested in doing long term research on in situ methods. The Interior
Department's program would be much more understandable if the
four above assumptions were valid. If conventional techniques were
unavailing and, hence, if private shale lands were at a great disadvantage relative to public lands, it would be in the interest of proper disposition policy for public resources that the government take steps to
increase its resource value by developing low-cost utilization and by
leasing the lands on competitive terms. If the government can induce
firms to develop the necessary methods at their own expense and then
to make the methods available to all, the direct costs to the government may be minimized, and leasing revenues may still be satisfactory. Such results will follow only if the firms operating under
the research and development leases receive only production leases
on modest sized tracts, as reward and only if other firms may then
bid on additional tracts on the basis of information made available
by the original lessee.
There are flaws in the plan. Firms are not fond of entering into
agreements which sacrifice patent monopoly privileges. The research
and development lease is likely to be unworkable because of too
much uncertainty on both sides. Furthermore, it is highly probable
that economical methods of shale oil production now exist, and the
government does not have a monopoly even on lands suitable for
in situ retorting. In view of these considerations, it is more logical
for the government to adopt a different program involving the
contracting out of research and development and the granting of
production leases to those firms which are now, or which will be
later in a position to undertake production on federal lands. The
terms of these production leases should be carefully drawn; some
of the problems involved in such leasing arrangements are briefly
discussed below.
13. Udall's explicit contention. Id. at 298.
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Competitive bidding for leases, with the submission of sealed
bids, appears to be the best approach economically-there is little
argument on this point. However, more discussion of the object of
the bidding-bonus, royalty, rentals, tract size, and the like-is
needed. In order to evaluate rival bids unambiguously, only one of
the lease conditions should be variable, and the others should be
held constant. If there were no uncertainty of the future profitability of shale oil operations, bonus bidding by itself might suffice
since the present discounted value of the lands could be computed,
and competition among bidders would insure that the lessor would
realize, as the lease bonus, all of the economic rent in excess of the
competitive supply price of the bidder's services. If uncertainty exists,
royalty bidding is preferable to the bidder since it results in some
sharing of the risk of failure between lessor and lessee. Lease rental
rates and tract size would not ordinarily be appropriate key variables for competitive lease bidding.
If bonuses were to be the sole object of bidding and if costs are low
and prices are predicted to remain stable per-acre bids might be
quite high. While bonuses cannot be predicted with any precision,
order-of-magnitude comparisons might be instructive. For high
quality onshore crude oil prospects, bonuses might be in the range
of $1000 per acre; for similarly promising offshore crude oil
prospects, $10,000 per acre, and for high-quality shale lands,
$100,000 per acre. Bonus bidding alone, however, would not be
appropriate since considerable uncertainty exists regarding future
profitability, although the physical extent of deposits being bid upon
would be subject to less uncertainty. Furthermore, the requirement
that bonus be paid in full at the time of awarding the lease would
further increase barriers to entry in a situation already characterized
by high barriers. Also, the risk of initial investment would lead firms
to use a high interest rate in discounting future net receipts so the
total lease bonuses received by the government might be much
smaller than the value of a subsequent stream of royalties, if the
industry proves profitable. If a high discount rate is employed, reserves to be produced 20 or more years in the future will be valued
at very low levels so that a firm currently might bid very little more
for a 10 billion barrel tract than for a 5 billion barrel tract. This
possibility would limit the size of tracts to be leased. Thus, although
sole reliance on lease bonus bidding would have the advantage that
the bonus would be a sunk cost without influence on subsequent production rates through influence on marginal costs, its disadvantages,
in terms of inherent uncertainties, high discount factors, and increas-
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ing barriers to entry, would effectively rule out this simple method
of lease bidding.
Royalties could be made the leasing variable by specifying fixed
per-acre bonuses and rentals. Much depends upon the type of royalty
-whether applicable to crude shale oil or refined products, whether
specific, ad valorem, or expressed as a share in net profits. If an ad
valorem royalty on crude shale oil were to be adopted, there is a
possibility that the 12.5 per cent rate traditional in crude petroleum
would be too high, at least initially. Interior's 3 per cent figure seems
more appropriate at present. Per barrel royalties are preferable
to per-ton royalties because of variations in the richness of deposits,
and ad valorem royalties generally are preferable to specific royalties if only because of the likelihood of price changes. Royalties are
preferable to bonuses in that they are paid in relation to production
rather than in an initial lump sum and, hence, pose less of a barrier
to entry. In addition they are more flexible because periodic renegotiation of rates is possible. Per-unit royalties have a conservation disadvantage because they constitute an addition to marginal
production cost which may induce premature abandonment of properties when incremental production costs increase beyond a certain
point. The use of net income royalties avoids this inefficiency, but it
can cause conflict between lessor and lessee over the method used to
compute net income.
Relatively high lease rentals would seem appropriate to prevent
speculative holding of idle lands. The preferable policy for production leases probably would depend upon the workability of net income royalties. If workable, leases should be awarded on the basis
of net income royalty bidding coupled with relatively low fixed
bonuses and relatively high annual rental requirements. If net income royalties are not workable, Professor Walter Mead's proposal would be preferable-bonus bidding with low fixed royalties
and a high annual rental requirement. 4
B.

Depletion Policy for Oil Shale

Although there has been some agitation for obtaining 27.5 percent depletion on crude shale oil, it is likely that most industry participants in the debate are resigned to the impossibility of achieving
this rate, and would be glad to settle for the present 15 percent if
it could be applied to the crude shale oil rather than to the mined
shale. The present law provides for a maximum 15 percent on the
14. Id. at 389.
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value of the mined shale; this percentage applied to crude shale oil
would probably amount to a tax deduction equivalent to no more
than about 5 percent on the value of the shale oil. Prospects for obtaining 15 percent on the value of the shale oil are doubtful, since
it would require a judicial decision in favor of the change.
It is at least conceivable that political action might bring about
a change in the depletion law, but this is unlikely since the shale oil
industry has no established lobby, and the petroleum industry seems
divided on the question of whether to support higher shale oil depletion. Those who see shale as a threat to market stability would be
opposed, and the others will probably want to avoid the issue of
raising the depletion rate to 27.5 per cent because of the necessary
re-opening of the entire depletion debate to fresh examination at
the legislative level in an atmosphere of treasury department criticism, and widespread taxpayer suspicion or hostility toward the
allowance. Those fearful of re-opening debate may assume that not
only are the prospects for increasing the depletion allowance for
shale oil rather small, but that there is some increased risk that depletion rates for crude oil may be reduced.
Even if 27.5 per cent depletion were to be achieved for shale oil,
it would by no means imply that crude petroleum's tax advantage
over shale had been negated. Since percentage depletion is always
limited to no more than 50 percent of net income, a shale oil industry
would not obtain the benefit of 27.5 percent depletion unless its ratio
of net income to gross receipts was 55 percent or more. The author's
studies indicate that in shale oil the same ratio would be about 32
percent, so that the effective net rate of percentage depletion would
be 16 percent no matter how high the gross rate. In addition, if
rate of return is computed on a discounted cash flow basis, the petroleum industry's ability to expense intangible drilling and development costs is at least as important as percentage depletion in improving the calculated rate of return. In crude oil the ratio of such
costs to total costs is high because of exploration risk and because
most drillings result in dry wells rather than in successful wells. In
shale oil, such a high ratio is not needed, and almost all investment
costs must be capitalized and depreciated instead of being subject
to immediate expensing. (The gross tax advantage of crude oil over
shale is, however, not necessarily the same as the net economic advantage since shale oil investment is in part desirable precisely because there is no need for continual exploration efforts.)
With regard to public lands, decisions on depletion and on leasing
policy are intertwined in such a way that the value of a highly effective rate may be competed away through the medium of bonus-
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bidding. Assume that lease bidding is on a bonus basis only, that
royalties and rents are fixed at relatively low levels, and that the
government has made firm policy commitments on imports, depletion, and the phasing-in of shale oil so that firms can compute the
present discounted value of oil shale lands with a good deal of confidence. If a shale tract is worth $50 million with a zero depletion
rate, and a 15 percent rate will increase the value by $10 million to
$60 million, perfectly competitive bidding among firms will increase
the bonus on such a tract by the same $10 million. Under these circumstances, granting depletion on public lands would increase current
leasing revenues at the expense of later tax revenues but would not
permit the firms themselves to realize any net advantage from any
particular depletion rate. The principle remains the same even if
the assumptions regarding government policies are relaxed so as
to increase uncertainty about future earnings. Only by relaxing the
assumption that the bidding is perfectly competitive will the principle be compromised. (If the treasury's opportunity cost of funds
is lower than the rate at which bidders discount the future, such a
means of raising revenue is inappropriate from the federal government's standpoint, regardless of the many other facets of the
problem.) Raising depletion rates would therefore be of limited
value to shale oil producers, and it would be of greater value to
holders of private lands than to leasers of public shale lands. 5
C.

Petroleum Import Policies

It is scarcely necessary to state that the prospects for the development of a shale oil industry depend critically upon the future level of
domestic crude oil prices, which in turn are dependent upon limitation of supply by import controls and domestic production regulation. The import control program is based exclusively on the national security argument that "excessive" imports would destroy incentives in the domestic industry and reduce its scale of operations
below some critical level necessary for minimal security. The entire
import control program should be subjected to renewed study in the
light of the probable degree of existence of a domestic shale oil industry at various crude oil price levels. The impact on security of
such additional domestic supplies obtained by import control relative to the costs of such control, and the impact of alternative
methods of achieving an equivalent degree of security must also be
considered. Since such a study would require considerable time, it is
15. One alleged advantage of in situ methods of retorting is that the oil produced
would qualify for 27.5 per cent depletion. But this is not explicitly provided for in
present tax law, and prospects for amending the law are problematical.
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unwise to insist that immediate action be taken to "clarify" future
import controls policy.
As long as the present system is in effect, however, it is clear that
there is no reason why shale oil should not qualify as a refinery input
for purposes of computing a refiner's import quota. This appears to
be the only shale oil policy issue which could be resolved quickly
and without likelihood of serious error. There is no reason why the
Oil Import Regulation should not be amended to include shale oil
in addition to crude petroleum as a qualified "refinery input." (At
any rate, one would be suspicious that those opposing such an amendment were motivated by considerations other than those of national
security, the explicit basis for the import control program.) If the
import control program is later changed, this amendment may become irrelevant to the new program, but as long as the present program is in effect there is every reason for expanding the definition of
refinery input by such an amendment.
D.

Domestic Crude Oil ProductionControls:State
ConservationRegulation Policy
The system of domestic crude oil production controls through
state conservation commission activity is similarly overdue for a
comprehensive reappraisal of costs and benefits of existing and alternative programs, although the effectiveness of state control depends
ultimately upon federal legislation-such as the Connally Act of
1935, prohibiting interstate shipment of violative production.
The federal government has no direct jurisdiction over state
commissions, but it has considerable potential influence in crude oil
production because of increasing output from federal offshore lands.
The federal government in managing production from its lands
should resist any effort to introduce conservation regulation in shale
oil on any basis remotely resembling the crude oil industry model.
Conservation regulation in crude oil has been widely and justifiably
criticized for its inefficiencies and the burdens it has placed upon both
consumers and efficient producers. Moreover, unless in situ methods
of production are perfected, there will not be the slightest analogy
between the genuine conservation problems in crude petroleum and
similar problems which may arise in shale oil. In fact, there should
be no conservation problems in shale oil except those relating to
rather different matters such as the conservation of the scenic appeal
of the landscape and the avoidance of air and water pollution.
The question of whether the government could prevent proration
of production from federal shale lands on a market demand basis was
explicitly considered during the Hart hearings. When asked by Coun-
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sel for the Subcommittee majority whether or not the federal shale
lands could be made exempt from state production quotas, Assistant
Attorney General Donald Turner replied: "We could certainly so
provide. And I think the consequences would be clear. The successful
development of shale oil would put an end to the state prorationing
program."'1 6 While the latter statement might need some qualification, the implication is evident that any very rapid expansion of shale
oil output might put very great pressures on state commissions. If
after study it appears desirable to limit the expansion rate of shale
oil output, it would be vastly preferable to limit expansion under an
explicit phasing-in program instead of through a production control
program in the disguise of a physical conservation measure. Some
aspects of such a phasing-in program are discussed below.
E.

The Possibility of an Explicit FederalPolicy on the "Phasing-in"
of Shale Oil Productioninto the NationalEnergy Market

It is likely that a major factor impeding entry into shale oil is the
failure of the government even to adumbrate any conscious policy
for the phasing of shale oil into the national energy market. Although
both petroleum industry and shale oil spokesmen in their public
statements have discounted the idea of a rapidly growing shale oil
industry exerting downward pressure on prices, it would appear possible that output might increase more rapidly than total market demand if early production experience leads to rapid process innovation and cost reductions. The processes involved-very large scale
materials handling in mining and continuous-flow fluids processing in
retorting-seem to lend themselves to cost-reducing breakthroughs
in technology. In particular, the development of extremely large scale
continuous mining equipment is probable once the industry begins to
develop and a sizable market for such equipment is created. While
it is arguable that capacity is unlikely to expand as rapidly as total
demand, much depends upon profit rates and inducement to entry.
The private sector of our economy is justly noted for its rapid response to new profit opportunities, and as Professor Walter Mead
noted during the Hart hearings: " . . . the industry right now is
profitable, and not just a little bit-it is very profitable . . . if this

industry consequently gets started in a big way, we are talking then
about a large increase in the supply of oil in the American market.
And given that, any further price increase for crude seems to me to
be out of the question. Prices are likely to go down."' 7
16. Competitive Aspects, supra note 1, at 363.
17. Id. at 400.
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Mr. Morton Winston of the Oil Shale Corporation states that in
his view shale oil will probably supply no more than one-fifth of the
market growth between now and 1980, but he also made some remarks which support the adoption of a phasing-in program or its
equivalent: " . . . this industry will not grow in an orderly manner
into the role it can play in meeting a portion, a significant or small one,
of the nation's petroleum needs, unless the federal acreage is planned
and opened, and unless it is done within a reasonably short
time . . ."18
Of greater interest and significance were certain statements by
Secretary Udall indicating that his thinking was proceeding along
parallel lines. The following quotations merit close study:
" .. . if we handle the development of this resource wisely, if
the Government maintains control, as it must-oil shale ultimately,
when you look on down the road, will be the dominant factor in this
larger picture. The Federal Government, by controlling the rate of
development of oil shale can in effect much more wisely determine
what its energy policies should be."'"
"We will decide that in terms of a national energy policy that we

want to bring in a certain amount of production, and we will put it
out for leases, and on a competitive basis of some kind, perhaps. This
is probably what we would do if we had the process perfected today." 20

"[the Canadians] limited their production [of tar sands oil] .. .
in order to phase it into their whole energy economy, in order to not
disrupt it. Now, this is the type of problem that we are going to have
down the road when we start talking about how oil shale development
would fit into the total national energy problem . . . [The Cana-

dians] can control it, just as we would be able to control oil shaleso as to produce
the minimum disruptive effect on their energy
2
economy."1 1

From this one may safely infer that the government is considering taking a very definite role in the phasing of shale oil production
into the energy market. If high priority is given to producing the
"minimum disruptive effect" in the manner of the apparently admired, but highly restrictive, production control policy of the Alberta Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, then the price effects
of shale oil will be quite minimal indeed. One suspects that many
potential entrants into the shale oil industry are awaiting govern18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 320.
at 284.
at 294 (emphasis supplied).
at 306-307.
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ment assurance, in the form of explicit and detailed policies, that the
advent of shale oil on the scene will not be allowed to depress crude
oil prices. Such assurances would probably have a much greater impact on willingness to enter the industry than would even the announcement of a quite liberal shale leasing policy.
The government should exercise the utmost caution before adoption of any explicit policies regarding the phasing of shale oil into
the market, and no steps should be taken without making studies of
the effects of such a policy on crude oil price levels, relative costs of
different energy sources, and national security, in the context of the
other policies supporting crude oil prices.
F.

Policies to Promote Competition in the Shale Oil Industry

During the Hart Subcommittee hearings, justified concern was
continually expressed regarding the probable inability of the small
firm to gain a foothold in the shale oil industry. No one was able
to propose a feasible plan to allow the entry of genuinely small firms,
and it seems that for reasons of economies of scale and because of
capital requirements, there is simply no place whatsoever in the
industry for the firm which is small in absolute size. This fact,
and its implications for competitive behavior in the shale oil industry,
must be fully assessed.
While it may be possible to increase the number of entrants into
the industry by encouraging consortia of many smaller interests, the
fact remains that the resulting consortia must have large absolute
size. Atomistic competition will never prevail in shale oil, but after
all, relative rather than absolute size is the crucial determinant of a
firm's market power. If the shale oil industry can ultimately attract
as many as 20 major firms with diverse interests in various phases
of the energy market so that the imperfect alignment of interest
existing in the crude petroleum industry is reproduced in the shale
oil industry, the latter industry should not be extremely concentrated
as major industries go, and competitive rivalry will exist. However,
it is probable that the shale industry is going to be more concentrated than the crude oil industry and that almost all of the firms
will be fully integrated. Since the asymmetrical organizational structure of crude oil companies has been a large factor in the historical
dynamics of crude oil competition, it is to be expected that the degree of homogeneity of interests among shale oil producers will tend
to reduce competition. Therefore, to the extent that it may prove
possible, public policy should seek to promote the entry of organizationally and technologically diverse firms into the industry:
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firms using different retorting methods; firms with varying degrees
of vertical integration; firms with and without investments in oil,
coal, and electric power.
Nevertheless, the industry will in all likelihood be substantially if
not extremely concentrated, and without any fringe of numerous
small "independents." Hence antitrust in the industry will be present. Thus, the absence of any constellation of small operators presents insight into a little-publicized reason for the reluctance of
major firms to start the process which will increase the role of shale
oil in the liquid fuels market. And not only will the lack of numerous
small firms expose the industry to more searching antitrust scrutiny,
but it will contribute, among other factors, to a serious weakening
in the political power of the industry. Political influence does not
depend nearly as much upon the financial power of the few major
firms, as it does upon the large number of small producers, the
great number of royalty recipients, and the widespread geographical
incidence of oil production among the states. Moreover, while crude
oil is currently produced in over thirty states, shale oil will be produced in at most three states, and possibly in only one for quite a
while. A state's position on oil industry legislation is curiously affected by the circumstance of its having some crude oil production,
even though it may consume vastly more than it produces. If for no
other reason this is because producer lobbies are much more active
and effective than consumer lobbies. In the crude oil industry, producing states are not only numerous, but include almost all of the
politically most influential states; in the shale oil industry, producing
states are not only few but without much political influence at the
national level.
Since shale oil production will inevitably be the preserve of the
large firm, there will be no fringe of small "independents" like the
ten thousand and more miniscule participants in the petroleum industry whose political efforts (chiefly effective at the state level, but
very influential nationally because of the key role of state regulatory
commissions) are probably more vital to the present status of the
industry than are their economic contributions. And since private
shale lands are seldom encumbered by a network of numerous small
royalty interests, and federal lands are entirely free from such complications, there will be no lobby of several million royalty recipients
with the political power to influence the legislative fortunes of the
shale oil industry. Shale oil production will therefore be more vulnerable to shifts in administrative and legislative climates than the
crude oil industry has been.
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III
CONCLUSIONS REGARDING PROBABLE INDUSTRY REACTION TO
VARIOUS ALTERNATIVE SHALE OIL POLICY POSITIONS

No discussion of shale oil policy issues can be conclusive in the
present fragmentary state of basic information. Under these circumstances, conclusions must be limited to two classes of observations.
First, there is great need for additional data, particularly on the
part of government policy makers. Many comprehensive studies are
needed upon which to base difficult policy decisions. These studies
cannot be made quickly; hence there is no prospect for immediate
clarification of existing uncertainties. But there is no need for hasty
decisions. Those firms having developed the most efficient processes
will be able to enter the industry in due course, producing from private shale holdings. Energy supplies are not currently so short that
it is necessary to accelerate the rate of production from public lands
by putting a premium on favorable lease terms and on an otherwise
artificially stimulated climate for shale development.
The second class of observations comprises those relating to probable industry reaction to alternative shale oil policy positions, if and
when such positions are announced. Four major alternatives may be
selected for brief discussion: ( 1 ) the preservation of the status quo;
(2) the adoption of very strict leasing policies; (3) the adoption of
quite liberal leasing policies; and (4) the adoption of a unified program which would encourage entry by promising greater stability in
future energy markets.
J.

Maintenance of the Status Quo on Shale Oil Policy Issues
If the status quo is maintained for the indefinite future through
continued postponement of positive decisions on shale leasing or depletion allowances, and through maintenance of the present degree
of protection of domestic crude oil prices; then, it may be predicted
that entry will be slow unless and until major technical breakthroughs are achieved which will unambiguously demonstrate that
shale oil costs are much lower than crude oil costs. Until that time
the growth of the industry will be slow. Assuming that Colony does
achieve production by 1970, one or more additional firms will probably enter the market soon after, the most likely entrants being
major oil companies short of crude oil which are now doing research
in "conventional" shale mining and retorting techniques. Most of the
major oil firms, however, will probably continue to devote much of
their efforts to long term research on in situ methods.
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The Adoption of Very Restrictive Leasing Policies for
FederalOil Shale Lands

If very restrictive leasing policies are adopted for federal oil
shale lands, the situation will be little different from the status quo
projection. If bonuses, royalties, rentals, and other lease terms are
too restrictive, there will be no successful applicants for leases, and
major firms may lose interest in in situ research, to the extent that
the methods investigated would be applicable only to federal lands.
Consequently, there may be increased interest on the part of the
large firms in more conventional techniques.
C.

The Adoption of Very LiberalLeasing Policies for Federal
Oil Shale Lands

If very liberal leasing policies are adopted so that bonuses, rentals,
and royalties are low and the amount of lands leased relatively large,
more interest in shale development will be stimulated. More firms
will enter the industry, but there will probably be much semi-speculative or defensive holding of reserves, as major firms obtain lands
and keep them idle, pending the development of methods to exploit
them. There will be more research by major firms, particularly in in
situ techniques. If governmentally subsidized research is undertaken
as part of a highly liberal program, and the results made available
to all, technical breakthroughs may occur sooner, and more major
firms may enter the industry on a large scale at an earlier stage in
the industry's development.
D.

The Adoption of a Unified ProgramEncouragingEntry by
Promising GreaterStability in Future Energy Markets

The last alternative is presented to provide a marked contrast
with the first and not necessarily as the preferred alternative. Here
it is assumed that a unified program is adopted by the government
which maximally guarantees future price stability in the domestic
energy market. Leasing policy will be liberal, subject to an overall
strategy of phasing in shale oil at the maximum level consistent with
crude oil stability. Import controls and conservation regulation will
be employed to serve this goal in much the same manner as they do
at present. Production from federal oil shale lands will be made
subject to market demand quotas. The depletion controversy will be
resolved by allowing 15 percent depletion on the value of crude shale
oil. Assuming this model, much entry on the part of major firms
should occur and considerable research on both in situ and conven-
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tional methods should be undertaken. Although Colony and the
crude-short majors would still be the first likely entrants, they would
soon be joined by the great majority of the major firms. New entry
through the medium of consortia of smaller firms might materialize,
and major pipeline projects would probably come about reasonably
early through joint ventures among major producers seeking to
achieve economies of large scale pipeline transportation. New
technology should develop more rapidly, and a greater number of
competitors, or at least rival firms, should enter the market earlier
in the history of the industry. On the debit side, the favorable climate thus created by government policy would rest upon a level of
oil prices well above world price levels.

